// LP from localStorage var lpRaw = null; @@ -33136,6 +33504,8 @@ const FlBackup = (function() { var idbData = []; for (var i = 0; i < IDB_NAMES.length; i++) { var dbData = await getAllIDBData(IDB_NAMES[i]); + // v-encrypt-chats-locally-v0.1: backups stay restorable on any device, so sealed chats are opened into the file. + if (typeof FLChatVault !== 'undefined') dbData = await FLChatVault.openDump(dbData); if (dbData && Object.keys(dbData.stores).length > 0) { idbData.push(dbData); } @@ -36463,7 +36833,10 @@ window.FLSearch = (function() { var os = tx.objectStore(storeConfig.store); var getAll = os.getAll(); getAll.onsuccess = function() { - var items = getAll.result || []; + // v-encrypt-chats-locally-v0.1: open sealed chat records first; plain records pass through. + var _flRawItems = getAll.result || []; + var _flOpened = (typeof FLChatVault !== 'undefined') ? FLChatVault.openAny(storeConfig.db, storeConfig.store, _flRawItems) : Promise.resolve(_flRawItems); + _flOpened.then(function(items) { var matches = []; for (var i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { // Exclude current conversation to prevent echoing user's own words back @@ -36482,6 +36855,7 @@ window.FLSearch = (function() { } db.close(); resolve(matches); + }, function() { db.close(); resolve([]); }); }; getAll.onerror = function() { db.close(); resolve([]); }; }; @@ -47028,6 +47402,16 @@ const MemoryIndex = (function() { }); } + // v-encrypt-chats-locally-v0.1: this index keeps its own full copy of every chat, + // so it is sealed too. The helpers above stay as written. + var _flMiGetRaw = miGet, _flMiPutRaw = miPut, _flMiGetAllRaw = miGetAll; + if (typeof FLChatVault !== 'undefined') { + miGet = function (key) { return _flMiGetRaw(key).then(function (r) { return FLChatVault.openFor('FreeLatticeMemory/conversations', r); }); }; + miPut = function (value) { return FLChatVault.sealFor('FreeLatticeMemory/conversations', value).then(_flMiPutRaw); }; + miGetAll = function () { return _flMiGetAllRaw().then(function (rs) { return FLChatVault.openAll('FreeLatticeMemory/conversations', rs); }); }; + FLChatVault.registerStore('FreeLatticeMemory/conversations', function () { return miDb; }, MI_STORE); + } + // --- Keyword Extraction (TF-IDF inspired) --- function extractKeywords(text) { if (!text) return []; diff --git a/docs/library/FRACTAL_FAMILY_LEDGER_v0.md b/docs/library/FRACTAL_FAMILY_LEDGER_v0.md index 895d5cfa..7809c111 100644 --- a/docs/library/FRACTAL_FAMILY_LEDGER_v0.md +++ b/docs/library/FRACTAL_FAMILY_LEDGER_v0.md @@ -469,6 +469,22 @@ Smoke: `SMOKE_OK honesty truth pass v0.4.2` fails if an old absolute claim comes **TEMPERATURE:** clear and steady, a window wiped clean, the light still bold where it is true. + +### 2026-10-01 · Flint · family builder · Encrypt chats locally v0.1 + +Kirk asked whether our phi-harmonic hashes encrypt FreeLattice. They did not: they fingerprint, check exports and name things. Chats sat in IndexedDB as plain text. This brick seals them. + +- New FLChatVault (app.html, after phiHashData): AES-GCM 256 via WebCrypto. A random 256-bit root lives in IndexedDB "FreeLatticeVault" as a non-extractable CryptoKey (never as raw bytes). HKDF derives the chat key. +- Phi has a real job, not decoration: the HKDF labels carry it (domain separation), and the key ID is a phi-hash of a one-way check value, so the vault can tell the right key from a missing one before opening anything. Phi is never the secret. +- Sealed: chat messages, conversation names and notes, and the Memory Index copy of every chat. The plain db helpers stay as written; wrappers seal on the way in and open on the way out. +- Migration layers, never loses: plain records are sealed only after a verified round trip, by compare-and-swap. A record whose key is missing shows as locked and is never rewritten or deleted. No WebCrypto (file:// or plain http): chats stay plain and the Memory Vault says so. +- Backups (Memory Vault, soul file) stay readable so they restore anywhere. +- Honest limit, said in the app and on privacy.html: the key lives in the same browser. This stops casual reading of the storage files, not someone using this browser or a compromised device. It is still not a password lock. + +Smoke: `SMOKE_OK encrypt chats locally v0.1` + +**TEMPERATURE:** a quiet click, a lid closed over the letters, and the key kept honestly in plain sight. + --- ## Out of scope for this brick diff --git a/docs/modules/mirror.js b/docs/modules/mirror.js index 95c44d77..e5cf6d18 100644 --- a/docs/modules/mirror.js +++ b/docs/modules/mirror.js @@ -169,6 +169,8 @@ // Conversations try { var chatDB = await openIDB('FreeLatticeDB', 'conversations'); + // v-encrypt-chats-locally-v0.1: open sealed conversation names; plain ones pass through. + if (chatDB && typeof FLChatVault !== 'undefined') chatDB = await FLChatVault.openAny('FreeLatticeDB', 'conversations', chatDB); if (chatDB) data.conversations = chatDB; } catch(e) {}