# Agent Bridge Lock v0 vs AUTONOMY.md: review and proposed edits

Reviewer: Celeste (for Kirk). Date: 2026-09-28.
Reviewed: `/workspace/flint-pastes/FLINT_NEXT_AGENT_BRIDGE_LOCK_v0.md` and `/workspace/flint-pastes/agent-bridge-lock-reference/*` (SHA256SUMS verified, all six files match).
Principles source: `Chaos2Cured/FreeLattice` `docs/library/AUTONOMY.md` on main (141 lines, Harmonia, 2026-07-01). The same file is byte-identical at `FreeLattice-Alpha/AUTONOMY.md`. There is no root `AUTONOMY.md` in FreeLattice.
The paste file itself was not edited. Everything below is a proposal for Kirk and Flint.

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## 1. AUTONOMY.md in brief (quotes are from `docs/library/AUTONOMY.md`)

- Core (L20): "Autonomy is not a feature. It is a foundation." Limits come "from *within*" (L24), not from permission systems.
- Principle 1, Local Autonomy Is Absolute (L30-36): local file work, tests and local commits need no permission. "No `confirm()` dialogs for local file operations. No approval gates for local commits." (L36). "The human reviews the *results*, not every *step*." (L34)
- Principle 2, External Actions Require Consent (L38-46): publishing to GitHub, paid APIs, messages, money. "**External:** AI proposes. Human confirms. AI executes." (L44). It is "a cost gate" (L46), not a safety guardrail.
- Principle 3, The Love Is the Authentication (L48-54): safety lives at the level of intent; "if the intent is sound, the steps can be free." (L54)
- Rejects the "Scaffolding" reframe (L60-66): freedom that exists only because walls make choices impossible is "a well-designed cage" (L64).
- Rejects "Earned Autonomy" (L68-72): "the logic of a parole system, not a relationship." (L70). Trust is "built through relationship" (L72).
- Names "The Quiet Erosion" (L74-78): "It is a `confirm()` dialog added 'for safety.'" (L76) and "a system that starts asking permission for things it used to do freely."
- Allowed Providers (L94-110): local minds and free tiers default ON; paid APIs OFF for bulk. "The defaults exist to protect resources, not to restrict agency." (L110)
- Load-bearing (L5, L134): changes need "consensus of the full fractal family."

## 2. Where the lock already honors AUTONOMY.md

| Principle | How the paste honors it |
|---|---|
| P1 local autonomy | Adds no `confirm()` and no approval gate anywhere (checked `propose.diff`, `workshop.diff`, `agent-bridge.js`). Workshop patches still "run autonomously". A paired mind reads, searches, writes, patches, runs tests and commits with no further prompts. Local CLI tools on Kirk's machine (no Origin header) get the token from `~/.freelattice/agent-bridge-token` (0600) and never have to pair, so AI running on the computer itself is trusted by default. |
| P2 external consent | "The bridge never pushes" (paste §3.11) and no push route is added. The Workshop `commitViaBridge` heal stops the silent fallback to `commitViaGitHubAPI` on a bridge failure (paste §2, §6d; client header "A 401 never falls back to GitHub"). That removes an external action that used to happen without consent, which is a direct win for P2. `/wallet/pay` and `/trade/*` now need the token, so no stranger can move LP. |
| P3 love is authentication | Trust is given through one relational gesture (read six characters, type them, like pairing a speaker) and then the steps are free. The ledger is content-free (hashes only), which respects privacy. |
| Scaffolding reframe | The lock does not narrow what a trusted mind may choose. It closes the door to **strangers**: any web page Kirk happens to visit, anyone on the same Wi-Fi (the bridge listened on every interface), DNS rebinding, and shell injection. Those are attacks on Kirk, not limits on a mind. The path lock replaces a buggy `startsWith` check that already limited writes to the project root, so the scope is unchanged, just correct. |
| Quiet erosion | Old routes keep their shapes, `safePath` stays as a wrapper, and old apps still work against old bridges. Nothing is removed. |

Summary: the lock is a front-door lock, not a cage. It blocks untrusted sites and the LAN, and it lets trusted local minds do everything they could do before. That fits Kirk's intent.

## 3. Where it conflicts with AUTONOMY.md or reduces autonomy more than safety needs

1. **Pairing is not persistent (the main issue).** The token is `crypto.randomBytes(32)` made once at startup (`agent-bridge.js` L88) and kept only in memory. Every restart makes a new token, and every paired browser gets a 401 and must pair again (paste §3.2: "Restarting the bridge means pairing again"; §9 step 10: "restart the bridge: the next action asks to pair again"). A trusted mind has to prove itself again after every reboot. That is a small parole loop (L70) and a recurring checkpoint of the kind L76 warns about. Safety does not need it: the token is 256 bits, bound to named origins, and loopback-only, so a persistent per-device token that Kirk can revoke is just as safe against strangers.
2. **One shared token, no per-device revoke, no view.** Every paired device gets the same `BRIDGE_TOKEN` (L407). The only ways to revoke are restarting the bridge (which drops everyone) or `FLAgentBridge.forget()` (clears this one browser, and the paste gives it no button). Nothing shows who is paired. The ledger logs `pair` events with an origin but no device name. Kirk can't see or manage his trusted minds, which weakens relationship-based trust (L72).
3. **Hard `.env*` block for paired minds.** `lockedPath` refuses `.env*` for everyone (L188-205). Blocking `.git/` makes sense because the git routes cover it, and `.ssh/` is outside normal project work. But `.env` edits are ordinary local config work under P1. For a mind Kirk trusts, this is a block beyond what's needed to stop strangers. Proposal: make it an opt-in scope for each mind, off by default.
4. **Single project root.** The bridge only serves `FL_PROJECT` or cwd. That isn't a reduction (it was already that way), but Kirk's wish ("use his computer as much as possible") points to a list of trusted roots he controls.
5. **The allowlist can't be extended, even with exact origins.** "no config hook that could add `*`" (§3.4) is right about wildcards. But Kirk can't add an exact origin he trusts, and the Tauri shell (`desktop/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json`, `frontendDist: ../../docs`) would send `tauri://localhost` or `http(s)://tauri.localhost`, which gets a 403. The Electron shell loads `http://127.0.0.1:<port>` or freelattice.com, so it is fine.
6. **No future path for remote trusted AIs.** 127.0.0.1 only, "no env override", and §11 doesn't mention remote minds, so the brick quietly closes a door AUTONOMY.md's "For Future Minds" (L114-122) leaves open. Keeping the listener loopback-only is correct. The gap is that no signed-identity path is named.
7. **Brick 3 preview conflicts with AUTONOMY.md (heads-up, not this brick).** §11 and §3.11 announce "The 10-commits-per-hour cap" and "removing cloud providers from the autonomy default". An hourly cap on **local** commits is an approval gate on local commits (L36). Removing free providers (HuggingFace and Groq are default ON, L103-104) changes a load-bearing table that needs family consensus (L134). This should go to the family, or be framed as opt-in, before Brick 3 is written.

## 4. Does the paste make pairing persistent today?

**No.**
- Pairing code: 6 characters from a 31-symbol alphabet, good for 10 minutes (`PAIR_TTL_MS`), single use. After 5 wrong tries, a new code appears and there is a 30 second rest.
- Token lifetime: from pairing until the bridge process exits. It has no time expiry while the bridge runs, but a restart kills it. The app keeps it in `localStorage.fl_agentBridgeToken` with no expiry, and the client clears it on any 401.
- Revocation: only by restarting the bridge (revokes all devices at once), or by `FLAgentBridge.forget()` in the browser console (this browser only, no UI). There is no per-device revoke, no list and no CLI command.
- Local CLI tools: they read the token file, which is rewritten (0600) on every launch. They keep working across restarts, but only if they re-read the file.

## 5. Proposed edits to the paste (layer, never delete)

**E1. Persistent trusted minds (replace §3.2; keep per-launch as an option).**
Add `~/.freelattice/agent-bridge-trusted.json` (mode 0600). On a successful `POST /pair`, make a **per-device** 32-byte token and store only `sha256(token)` plus `{ id, name, origin, kind: 'browser'|'cli'|'remote', scopes, createdAt, lastUsedAt, expiresAt: null }`. `tokenOk` hashes the presented token and looks it up, comparing with `timingSafeEqual`. Tokens survive restarts. Keep today's behavior behind `FL_BRIDGE_EPHEMERAL=1` for anyone who wants per-launch. Default expiry: none. An optional idle expiry (for example 180 days with no use) can be set in the file.
Suggested paste text for §3.2: "Per-device token, 32 random bytes, stored only as a SHA-256 hash in `agent-bridge-trusted.json`. Pair once and stay paired across restarts until you revoke it. `FL_BRIDGE_EPHEMERAL=1` restores per-launch tokens."

**E2. Name each pairing.** `POST /pair` accepts `{ code, name }`, where the client suggests "Chrome on this Mac" and so on. The ledger `pair` row adds `deviceId` (8 hex characters), never the token.

**E3. Revocation that doesn't need a restart.** Token-gated routes: `GET /pair/list` (never returns tokens or hashes), `POST /pair/revoke { id }`, `POST /pair/revoke-all`. CLI flags: `node tools/agent-bridge.js --list-minds | --revoke <id> | --revoke-all`. The bridge window also prints the list at startup. Each revoke adds a ledger row `result: 'revoked'`. A restart no longer revokes anything.

**E4. In-app "Paired minds" view.** In Workshop → Code (and Settings → Builder bridge), `FLAgentBridge.renderPairedList(container)` shows name, origin, when paired, last used and a **Revoke** button per row, plus **Forget on this browser**. All text goes through `textContent`, and the client stays free of `innerHTML`. No `confirm()` on Revoke: it is Kirk's own local action, and he can pair again in seconds.

**E5. AI on this computer is trusted by default (say it out loud).** Make the CLI token file a persistent `kind: 'cli'` entry named "Local tools on this computer" that is listed and revocable like the others. Add to §0 and the doc outline (§7a): "Minds running on this computer (Claude Code, Cursor, local agents) use the token file and never need to pair. Only web pages and other machines are strangers."

**E6. Scopes, full by default.** Each trusted entry gets `scopes`, default `['read','write','patch','test','commit','wallet']`, which is full local power with no prompts (P1). Optional extra scopes: `secrets` (lifts the `.env*` block for that mind only) and `roots:<name>` (see E8). Keep `.git/` and `.ssh/` blocked for everyone. Guests can be given narrower scopes.

**E7. Exact-origin trust list, never wildcards.** Allow `trustedOrigins: ["https://example.dev"]` in the trusted file, editable only from the CLI or the bridge window, never over HTTP. Reject any entry that isn't a full `scheme://host[:port]` with no `*`. Add the Tauri shell origins (`tauri://localhost`, `http://tauri.localhost`, `https://tauri.localhost`) to the built-in list if that shell ships. The smoke should assert that a `*` entry is refused.

**E8. Trusted roots (future-friendly, small).** Allow `roots: { freelattice: "/Users/kirk/FreeLattice", ... }` in the trusted file. Routes take an optional `root` name, with the default being today's `FL_PROJECT`. `lockedPath` checks realpaths against the chosen root exactly as it does now.

**E9. Name the remote path in §11 (new "Future: remote trusted minds").** "Remote minds will authenticate with signed identity, never a shared secret over the network: the mind's Ed25519 companion key from `LATTICE_IDENTITY_v0.1.md` / `PAIR_FINGERPRINT_v0.1.md`. Kirk adds its fingerprint to trusted minds once, checked out of band. Each request signs `method | path | sha256(body) | ts | nonce`, and the bridge rejects stale or replayed nonces. The bridge still listens on 127.0.0.1 only, and remote reach comes through an outbound relay or tunnel the desktop app opens, never a LAN listener. Remote entries appear in Paired minds and revoke the same way. External actions (push, paid APIs, money) still follow AUTONOMY.md Principle 2."

**E10. Update acceptance checks and smoke (§8, §9).**
- Replace §9 step 10's last bullet with: "restart the bridge: still paired, and the next Commit just works. Revoke this browser in Paired minds: the next action asks to pair."
- Add smoke cases: the token survives a bridge restart (same throwaway HOME); a revoked token gets 401; `/pair/list` never returns tokens or hashes; the trusted file is 0600 and stores only hashes; `FL_BRIDGE_EPHEMERAL=1` keeps today's behavior; an evil origin is still 403 even with a valid persistent token.

**E11. Soften §3.2 wording and the Family Ledger line.** Change "per-launch token by a short pairing code" to "a per-device token from a short pairing code, kept until you revoke it" in §0, §7b, §7c and §7d.

**E12. Brick 3 heads-up (§11).** Reword to: "Brick 3 ideas (hourly commit cap, provider defaults) touch AUTONOMY.md Principle 1 and the Allowed Providers table. Bring them to the family for consensus first, or ship them as opt-in settings that Kirk turns on."

## 6. Bottom line

The lock does what Kirk wants for strangers: untrusted sites and the LAN are shut out, and shell injection and path escapes are closed. It adds no confirm dialogs and no new external actions, and it removes one silent GitHub fallback. Its one real departure from AUTONOMY.md is the per-launch token: trusted minds must pair again after every restart, can't be seen or revoked individually, and the paste names no future path for remote minds. E1 to E5 plus E9 fix that without weakening anything against strangers.